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Abstract
This paper raises the question of collective decision
making under possibilistic uncertainty; We study four
egalitarian decision rules and show that in the context
of a possibilistic representation of uncertainty, the use
of an egalitarian collective utility function allows to
get rid of the Timing Effect. Making a step further,
we prove that if both the agents’ preferences and the
collective ranking of the decisions satisfy Dubois and
Prade’s axioms (1995), and particularly risk aversion,
and Pareto Unanimity, then the egalitarian collective
aggregation is compulsory. This result can be seen as
an ordinal counterpart of Harsanyi’s theorem (1955).
Keywords: Decision under Uncertainty, Possibility The-
ory, Collective Choice, Egalitarianism, Timing Effect.
Introduction
The handling of collective decision problem under uncer-
tainty resorts on (i) the identification of a theory of decision
making under uncertainty (DMU) that captures the decision
makers’ behaviour with respect to uncertainty and (ii) the
specification of a collective utility function (CUF) as it may
be used when the problem is not pervaded with uncertainty.
One also needs to precise when the utility of the agents is
to be evaluated: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the real-
isation of the uncertain events. In the first case, the global
utility function is a function of the DMU utilities of the dif-
ferent agents; in the second case it is an aggregation, w.r.t.
the likelihood of the final states, of the collective utilities
of the states. For instance, in the probabilistic framework,
the comparison of decisions is based on the expected util-
ity model axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944). When several agents are involved, utilitarianism pre-
scribes the maximization of the sum of the expected utilities
(ex-ante) or the expected utility of the sum of the agents’
utilities (ex-post) - both actually coincide. An egalitarian ap-
proach can be based either on the min of the expected utili-
ties (ex-ante), or on the expected utility of the least satisfied
of the agents (ex-post) - but the two approaches can lead
to divergent rankings. This phenomenon has been called the
"Timing Effect" by Myerson (1981) in the early eighties.
Following Fleming (1952), Harsanyi (1955) showed that
if the collective preference satisfies von Neumann and Mor-
genstern’s axioms (i.e. when the ex-ante preference is an
expected utility) and the preference relations of the agents
also satisfy these axioms (i.e. when the ex-post preferences
also follow the EU model) then the sole possible collective
decision making approach (satisfying Pareto unanimity) is
the utilitarian one. Making a step further Myerson (1981)
proved that only the choice of an utilitarian social welfare
function can reconciliate the ex-ante and ex-post approaches.
These results rely on the assumption that the knowledge
of the agents about the consequences of their decisions is
rich enough to be modelled by probabilistic lotteries. When
the information about uncertainty cannot be quantified in a
probabilistic way the topic of possibilistic decision theory
is often a natural one to consider (Dubois and Prade 1995;
Dubois et al. 1998; Giang and Shenoy 2000; Dubois, Prade,
and Sabbadin 2001; Dubois et al. 2002; Dubois, Fargier, and
Perny 2003). The present paper raises the question of col-
lective decision making under possibilistic uncertainty. The
next Section recalls the basic notions on which our work re-
lies (decision under possibilistic uncertainty, collective util-
ity functions, etc.). We then present four egalitarian possi-
bilistic utilities and show that if both the collective prefer-
ence and the individual preferences do satisfy Dubois and
Prade’s axioms (1995), and in particular risk aversion, then
an egalitarian CUF is mandatory. This theorem can be con-
sidered as an ordinal counterpart to Harsanyi’s theorem. For
space reasons, proofs are omitted; they can be found online
at url ftp://ftp.irit.fr/IRIT/ADRIA/PapersFargier/aaai15.pdf.
Background
Collective utility functions
Let us consider a multi-agent decision problem defined by
a set A = {1, . . . , p} of agents, each agent i ∈ A being
supposed to express her preferences on a set of alternatives
(say, a set X), by a ranking function or a utility function ui
that associates to each element of X a value in a subset of
R+ (typically in the interval [0, 1]). The problem is then to
determine, for each x ∈ X , a collective utility degree that
reflects the collective preference.
When this collective preference depends only on the in-
dividual utilities of the agents, the collective utility can be
obtained by a collective utility function (CUF; for more de-
tails about collective utility functions see (Moulin 1988)) of
the form u(x) = f(u1(x), . . . , up(x)). Classical utility the-
ory prescribes that the best decisions are those that maximize
the sum of the individual utilities, i.e.:
u(x) = Σ
i∈A
ui(x)
This function possesses several good properties but fails to
ensure equity between agents. The egalitarian approach on
the contrary proposes to maximize the satisfaction of the
least satisfied agent, i.e. the CUF:
u(x) = min
i∈A
ui(x)
When the agents are not equally important (e.g. in an ad-
ministration board, or when the aim is more to aggregate
criteria than to satisfy a group), a weight wi can be associ-
ated to each i; this yields the use of a weighted sum in the
utilitarian case:
u(x) = Σ
i∈A
wi · ui(x)
or of a weighted minimum in the egalitarian case:
u(x) = min
i∈A
max((1− wi), ui(x))
Multi-agent decision making under risk
In presence of risk, i.e. when the information about the con-
sequences of decisions is probabilistic, a popular criterion
to compare decisions is the expected utility model axioma-
tized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944): an elemen-
tary decision is modelled by a probabilistic lottery over the
set X of its possible outcomes. The preferences of a sin-
gle decision maker are supposed to be captured by a utility
function assigning a numerical value to each outcome. The
evaluation of a lottery is performed through the computation
of its expected utility (the greater, the better)1. When several
agents are involved, two approaches are possible, depending
on when the utility of the agents is to be evaluated: after or
before the realization of the uncertain events. The ex-post
approach comes down to a problem of mono-agent decision
making under uncertainty (this agent being "the collectiv-
ity") by defining the utility function u as a CUF. On the con-
trary, the ex-ante approach combines the DMU utilities of
the different agents with the collective utility function.
In the probabilistic context, utilitarianism comes down to
calculate either the expected collective utility (ex-post), or
the aggregation of the individual expected utilities (ex-ante).
Egalitarianism prescribes to maximize either the expectation
1Notice that this kind of modelling is orthogonal to the one
more recently investigated in Computational Social Choice (Kon-
czak and Lang 2005; Mattei 2011; Lang et al. 2012); in the lottery
framework, the uncertainty pertains to the consequences of the de-
cisions and the agents have well established preferences on these
consequences; in the latter works, the preferences of the agents are
ill-known and can be represented or elicited in sophisticated ways.
Besides, the purpose of these works is generally more related to
complexity theory (determine the complexity of sophisticated de-
cision rules or the one of manipulating the issue of the vote, etc.).
of the minimum of the satisfaction degrees or the minimum
of the mathematical expectations. The two approaches do
not always coincide: this is the so called Timing Effect.
Counter-example 1. Consider two agents 1 and 2, two con-
sequences x1 and x2 and the probabilistic lotteries L1 and L2
given in Figure 1. The expected value of the minimum of the utilities
are:
0.7 ∗min(0.3, 0.5) + 0.3 ∗min(1, 0.4) = 0.33 for L1
0.2 ∗min(0.3, 0.5) + 0.8 ∗min(1, 0.4) = 0.38 for L2
So, ex-post, L2  L1. On the contrary, ex-ante, computing the
minimum of the expected utilities leads to L1  L2. Indeed:
min(0.7 ∗ 0.3 + 0.3 ∗ 1, 0.7 ∗ 0.5 + 0.3 ∗ 0.4) = 0.47 for L1
min(0.2 ∗ 0.3 + 0.8 ∗ 1, 0.2 ∗ 0.5 + 0.8 ∗ 0.4) = 0.42 for L2.
0.7 
0.3 
x1 : <0.3, 0.5> 
L1 
x2 : <1, 0.4> 
0.2 
0.8 
x1 : <0.3, 0.5> 
L2 
x2 : <1, 0.4> 
Figure 1: Two probabilistic lotteries in a bi-agent context.
The probability of xi according to a lottery labels the corre-
sponding edge; each xi is labelled by its vector of utilities.
In 1955, Harsanyi provided a theorem that is often inter-
preted as a justification of utilitarianism; he showed that if
(i) the collective preference satisfies von Neumann and Mor-
genstern’s axioms (1944), (ii) the preferences of each agent
also satisfy these axioms, and (iii) if two lotteries are in-
different for each agent they are considered as collectively
indifferent (Pareto indifference axiom), then the only appro-
priate collective CUF is the classical utilitarian one. Myer-
son (1981) proved that, in the probabilistic context, only the
use of an affine collective aggregation function overcomes
the Timing Effect, and conversely, that any attempt to in-
troduce equity causes a divergence between the ex-post and
ex-ante approaches.
(Mono agent) Decision Making under Possibilistic
Uncertainty
Harsanyi’s and Myerson’s results are strongly related to the
assumption of a probabilistic uncertainty and are valid only
in such a rich and sophisticated context. When the informa-
tion about uncertainty cannot be quantified in a probabilistic
way, the topic of possibilistic decision theory is often a nat-
ural one to consider.
The basic building block in possibility theory is the notion
of possibility distribution. Let S be a variable whose value is
ill-known and Ω its domain. The knowledge about the value
of S is encoded by a possibility distribution pi : Ω → [0, 1];
given ω ∈ Ω, pi(ω) = 1 means that realization of ω is totally
possible and pi(ω) = 0 means that ω is impossible. It is
assumed that pi is normalized, i.e. that there exist at least
one ω which is totally possible.
From pi, one can compute the possibility Π(A) and the
necessity N(A) of an event A ⊆ Ω: Π(A) = supω∈A pi(ω)
evaluates to which extent A is consistent with the knowl-
edge represented by pi, while N(A) = 1 − Π(A¯) = 1 −
supω/∈A pi(ω) corresponds to the extent to which A¯ is im-
possible and thus evaluates at which level A is certain.
Giving up the probabilistic quantification of uncertainty
yielded to give up the EU criterion as well. The develop-
ment of possibilistic decision theory has lead to the propo-
sition and the characterization of a series of possibilistic
counterparts of the EU criterion (Dubois and Prade 1995;
Dubois et al. 1998; Giang and Shenoy 2000; Dubois, Prade,
and Sabbadin 2001; Dubois, Fargier, and Perny 2003). Fol-
lowing (Dubois and Prade 1995) a one stage decision is
modelled by a (simple) possibilistic lottery, i.e. a normal-
ized possibility distribution over a finite set of outcomes X .
In a finite setting, a possibilistic lottery L can be written
L = 〈λ1/x1, . . . , λn/xn〉 where λj = piL(xj) is the pos-
sibility of getting outcome xj when choosing decision L;
this degree are also denoted by L[xj ].
A compound possibilistic lottery is a normalized possibil-
ity distribution over a set of (simple or compound) lotteries.
We shall denote such a lottery L = 〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉,
λi being the possibility of getting lottery Li according to L.
The possibility pii,j of getting consequence xj fromLi de-
pends on the possibility λi of getting Li and on the possibil-
ity λji of getting xj fromLi (for the sake of simplicity, we as-
sume that the Li’s are simple lotteries; the principle extends
to the general case); in other words, pii,j = min(λi, λ
j
i ). The
possibility of getting xj from L = 〈λ1/L1, . . . , λm/Lm〉 is
simply the max, over all the Li’s, of the pii,j . In decision
theory, a compound lottery is generally assumed to be in-
different (according to the DM’s preference) to the simple
lottery defined by:
Reduction(L)
= 〈max
i=1,m
min(λ1i , λi)/x1, . . . , max
i=1,m
min(λni , λi)/xn〉
Example 1. The following figure provides an example of a
possibilistic compound lottery with its reduction:
(a) (b) 
x1 
x3 
x2 
x4 
1 
0.7 
0.8 
0.6 
Reduction (L) 
1 
0.8 
1 
0.7 
x1 
x2 
0.6 
1 
x4 
x3 
L 
L2 
L1 
Figure 2: A possibilistic compound lottery and its reduction.
(Dubois and Prade 1995) then proposed two global utili-
ties for evaluating any simple lottery:
U−(L) = min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]), u(x))
U+(L) = max
x∈X
min(L[x], u(x))
where n is an order reversing function (e.g. n(x) = (1 −
x)). Pessimistic utility U−(L) estimates to what extent it is
certain (i.e. necessary according to a measure N ) that L is
good. Its optimistic counterpart, U+(L) estimates to what
extent it is possible that L is good. They extend to any kind
of possibilistic lottery, by considering that the utility of a
compound lottery is simply the one of its reduction.
To the best of our knowledge, the question of multi-agent
decision making under possibilistic uncertainty has never
been studied. Beyond the proposition of egalitarian utilities
that suits possibilistic knowledge, we show in the present
paper that they do not necessarily suffer from the Timing
Effect, and we provide a representation theorem that can be
viewed as an ordinal counterpart of Harsanyi’s one.
Egalitarian collective decision making under
possibilistic uncertainty
In the more qualitative, ordinal, case of possibilistic lotter-
ies, four egalitarian utilities can be proposed (Ben Amor,
Essghaier, and Fargier 2014) - two pessimistic utilities and
two optimistic ones2:
2in
Definition 1.
U−minante (L) = mini=1,p
max(1− wi, min
x∈X
max(ui(x), 1− L[x]))
U−minpost (L) = min
x∈X
max(1− L[x], min
i=1,p
max(1− wi, ui(x)))
U+minante (L) = mini=1,p
max(1− wi,max
x∈X
min(ui(x), L[x]))
U+minpost (L) = max
x∈X
min(L[x], min
i=1,p
max(1− wi, ui(x)))
Example 2. As a matter of fact, consider two agents, the first
agent being less important than the second one (w1 = 0.6,
w2 = 1), and the simple lotteries L1, L2 on X = {x1, x2, x3}
depicted3 in Figure 3. We have:
U−minante (L1) = min( max(1− 0.6,minmax(1− 1, 0.8),max(1− 0.9, 0.1)),
max(1− 1,minmax(1− 1, 0.1),max(1− 0.9, 0.8)))
= 0.1
U−minpost (L1) = min( max(1− 1,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.8),max(1− 1, 0.1))),
max(1− 0.9,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.1),max(1− 1, 0.8))))
= 0.1
U+minante (L1) = min( max(1− 0.6,max(min(1, 0.8),min(0.9, 0.1))),
max(1− 1,max(min(1, 0.1),min(0.9, 0.8))))
= 0.8
U+minpost (L1) = max( min(1,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.8),max(1− 1, 0.1))),
min(0.9,min(max(1− 0.6, 0.1),max(1− 1, 0.8))))
= 0.4
U−minante (L2) = U
−min
post (L2) = U
+min
ante (L2) = U
+min
post (L2) = 0.8.
L2 
1 x3 : <0.8, 0.8> L1 
1 
0.9 
x1 : <0.8, 0.1> 
x2 : <0.1, 0.8> 
Figure 3: Two bi-agent possibilisitic lotteries.
It is obviously possible to define in the same way a series
of utilitarian possibilistic utilities (U−sumante ,U
+sum
ante , etc.) and
a series of max-oriented ones (U−maxpost , U
+max
post , etc. ). The
present paper prefers to focus in details on the egalitarian
ones, that look more coherent, and also more appealing from
an ethical point of view. First of all, it appears that the co-
incidence between ex-post and ex-ante approaches does not
imply utilitarianism. It is indeed easy to show that:
Proposition 1. U−minante (L) = U
−min
post (L).
We shall thus simply use the notation U−min. Such a co-
incidence does not happen in the "optimistic" case; with
2In our notation system the first exponent indicates the attitude
with respect to uncertainty: optimistic (+) or pessimistic(-); the sec-
ond one indicates the type of CUF used (min, max, sum, etc.).
3The consequences with a possibility degree of 0 are not repre-
sented in the drawings.
U+minpost a lottery is good as soon as there exists a possible
outcome satisfying all the agents; with U+minante , a lottery is
good when each agent forecasts an outcome that is good for
her (but it is not necessarily the same one for all): it may
happen that U+minpost (L) < U
+min
ante (L), as shown by Counter-
example 2. It holds that:
Proposition 2. U+minpost (L) ≤ U+minante (L).
Axioms for collective qualitative decision making
Let us now propose an axiomatization of the pessimistic
egalitarian utility (we denote it U−min = U−minpost =
U−minante ). Consider a set A of p agents, a finite set of con-
sequences X , a possibilistic scale V , the set of possibilis-
tic lotteries L obtained from V and X . The preference pro-
file 〈1, . . . ,p〉 gathers the preference relationsi of each
agent i on L.  denotes the collective preference on L.
Let us denote x the "constant" lottery leading to conse-
quence x for sure (s.t. L[y] = 0 for each y 6= x ; e.g. L2
in Figure 3): constant lotteries and elements of X are iden-
tified. In the same way, let Y be the lottery that represents a
subset Y of X (it provides the possibility degree 1 to each
y ∈ Y , and 0 otherwise). First of all, we formulate a conti-
nuity axiom on the consequences:
Axiom C (Continuity on X): ∀x, y ∈ X,∀B ⊆ A,∃z ∈
X such that: z ∼i x if i ∈ B and z ∼j y if i /∈ B.
This axiom requires that there exists a z in X that is in-
different to x for the agents in B and indifferent to y for
the others. When two agents are involved, Axiom C says
that if x and y are two elements of X , then X contains a
z corresponding to the vector of satisfaction 〈xi, yj〉. More
generally, this axiom requires the set of lotteries to be rich
enough to contain all the constant acts corresponding to all
the vectors of satisfaction (in a sense, C deals more with L
than with ). This implies in particular that X contains a
consequence x∗ that is ideal for all the agents, and a conse-
quence x∗ anti-ideal for all the agents. When the set of con-
sequencesX is too small, it is harmless to extend and enrich
it in order to obtain all the z that we need: in the following,
Axiom C is supposed by construction (in Harsanyi’s paper
it is implicit: X is identified with the set of utility vectors).
We now introduce the axiom of Pareto unanimity, that is
essential for collective choice:
Axiom P (Pareto Unanimity): If ∀i ∈ A, L i L′, then
L  L′.
Because we are rather interested in a cautious way of de-
cision making than in an adventurous one, the next axioms
are those proposed by (Dubois and Prade 1995) (their in-
terpretation is detailed in the literature, hence we refrain to
comment them further) . We write them below for any rela-
tion D ; in the following, these axioms will apply to  and
to the i’s:
Axiom 1: D on L is an equivalence relation (i.e. is com-
plete and transitive).
Axiom 2 (Certainty equivalence): ∀Y ⊆ X , ∃x ∈ Y s.t.
x and Y are equivalent for D.
Axiom 3 (Risk aversion): If ∀x ∈ X,L[x] ≤ L′[x] (L is
more specific than L′), then LD L′.
Axiom 4 (Weak independence): If L and L′ are equiva-
lents, then 〈λ/L, µ/L′′〉 and 〈λ/L′, µ/L′′〉 are also equiv-
alents, for any λ, µ s.t. max(λ, µ) = 1.
Axiom 5 (Lottery reduction): For any (compound lottery)
L, L ∼ Reduction(L).
Axiom 6 (Continuity of L): If ∀x ∈ X,
L′[x] ≤ L[x] then ∃λ s.t. L′ ∼ 〈1/L, λ/X〉.
Dubois and Prade (1995) show that the preference relation
on L defined by U− do satisfy Axioms 1-6 and that, recip-
rocally, if Axioms 1-6 are satisfied by some relation D, then
the simple lotteries are ranked as if they where be evaluated
by their pessimistic utilities. Technically, the satisfaction of
these axioms allows the definition of an ordered scale U , an
utility function u : X 7→ U , an order reversing function
n : V 7→ U such that L D L′ iff U−(L) ≥ U−(L′). This
axiomatization is a qualitative counterpart to von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s characterization of expected utility.
Properties of possibilistic collective utility functions
We now study the four decision rules in light of the axioms
and show that they are consistent, namely obeyed by the pes-
simistic egalitarian collective utility (U−min). Consider: a
set L of possibilistic lotteries built from a set X and a scale
V ; a set ui, i ∈ A of utility functions on X taking their val-
ues in [0, 1]; and a weight vector ~w ∈ [0, 1]p (where wi is
the weight of agent i). It holds that:
Proposition 3. The relations  and i defined by:
L  L′ iff U−min(L) ≥ U−min(L′),
L i L′ iff U−i (L) ≥ U−i (L′)
satisfy Axioms 1-6, as well as the Pareto unanimity axiom.
The satisfaction of Axioms 1-6 by the i’s is obvious
(U−i is by definition a pessimistic utility). Their satisfac-
tion by  is also straightforward: U−min is clearly a pes-
simistic DMU utility based on the utility function u(x) =
min
i=1,p
max(ui(x), (1− wi)).
The satisfaction of Pareto Unanimity is also easy to prove.
Suppose that L i L′, for all i. By definition, L i L′ iff
U−i (L) ≥ U−i (L′); L i L′ for each i implies that the
aggregation by the weighted minimum of the U−i ’s for L is
greater or equal to the one given to L′ (this aggregation is
non decreasing); then U−min(L) ≥ U−min(L′). In other
words, L  L′. Axiom P is thus satisfied.
Generally, we believe that all the ex-ante possibilistic
aggregations, and in particular U+minante , satisfy P, be they
egaliriarian or not (e.g. so do U−sumante , U
−max
ante , etc.) - sim-
ply because the CUFs are non decreasing. In our egalitarian
context:
Proposition 4. The relations  and i defined by:
L  L′ iff U+minante (L) ≥ U+minante (L′),
L i L′ iff U+i (L) ≥ U+i (L′)
satisfy Pareto Unanimity.
The problem is that U+minante may fail to satisisfy weak in-
dependence, as shown by the following counter-example:
Counter-example 2. Consider two equally important agents i.e.
(w1 = w2 = 1), and the three lotteries depicted in Figure 4.
0.5 
1 
x1 : < 0.3, 0.8> 
L1 
x2 : <0.6, 0.4> 
L3 
0.4 
1 
x1 : <0.3, 0.8> 
x2 : <0.6, 0.4> 
L2 
1 
0.5 
x1 : <0.3, 0.8> 
x2 : <0.6, 0.4> 
Figure 4: A counter-example to weak independance.
Let L and L′ be the lotteries defined by:
L = 〈1/L1, 0.9/L3〉, L′ = 〈1/L2, 0.9/L3〉.
U+minante (L1) = U
+min
ante (L2) = 0.5: L1 and L2 are indifferent
U+minante (L) = U
+min
ante (Reduction(L))
= U+minante (〈0.5/x1, 1/x2〉) = 0.5
U+mminante (L
′) = U+minante (Reduction(L
′))
= U+minante (〈1/x1, 0.9/x2〉) = 0.6.
Then, U+minante (L
′) > U+minante (L), which contradicts the axiom of
weak independence.
Concerning U+minpost , news are very bad, since it even fails
to satisfy Pareto Unanimity:
Counter-example 3. Consider the two lotteries of Figure
3 on X = {x1, x2, x3} and suppose now that the two agents
are equally important i.e. (w1 = w2 = 1). We get for agent 1:
U+(L1) = max(min(1, 0.8),min(0.9, 0.1)) = 0.8
U+(L2) = min(1, 0.8) = 0.8
and for agent
2:
U+(L1) = max(min(1, 0.1),min(0.9, 0.8)) = 0.8
U+(L2) = min(1, 0.8) = 0.8
while:
U+minpost (L1) = max(min(1,min(0.8, 0.1),min(0.9,min(0.1, 0.8)))) = 0.1
U+minpost (L2) = max(min(1,min(0.8, 0.8))) = 0.8
Hence L1 ∼1 L2, L1 ∼2 L2 but L2  L1, which contradicts
Pareto Unanimity.
A representation theorem for U−min
Let us now show that the relation that satisfies both Conti-
nuity, Pareto Unanimity and the axioms of pessimistic util-
ity can be captured by U−min - thus providing a counter-
part of Harsanyi’s theorem that allows (weighted) equity. For
the sake of brevity (and also because they look less inter-
esting: they suffer from the Timing Effect and can violates
important axioms), we let U+minante and U
+min
post for further re-
search. We first sketch the proof in the general case, allow-
ing more or less important agents: this provides a charac-
terization of U−min in its full generality. We impose equity
between agents in a second step - and rule out the weights.
We have seen in the previous Section that the set of ax-
ioms is consistent since satisfied by U−min. Let us now go
the reverse way. Consider a relation  on L (built on X and
V ) that satisfies Axioms 1 to 6, a set of relations i on the
same L that also satisfy these axioms, and suppose that the
axioms of Pareto unanimity and continuity of X hold.
First of all, since Axioms 1-6 are satisfied by  and i,
these relations can be represented by pessimistic utilities -
this is Dubois and Prade’s theorem of representation.
Let us now consider for any agent i ∈ A, the set >i =
{x ∈ X : ∀y, x i y} of the best consequences according to
i (this set cannot be empty because the i ’s are preorders).
Thanks to Axiom C, there exists a consequence x∗ that be-
longs to all the >i’s. By Pareto unanimity, x∗  y,∀y ∈ X .
In the same way, there exists a x∗ such that y  x∗,∀y ∈ X .
Thanks to Axiom C, we can define the constant act xi for
any agent i:
Definition 2. For any x ∈ X and any agent i, let xi be the
constant lottery s.t. xi ∼i x and xi ∼j x∗ for each j 6= i.
xi will be identified with the utility of x according to
agent i: the influence of the other agents is neutralized (they
get their best outcome, which behaves as a neutral element
in the pessimistic approach).
Let ∆i = {xi, x ∈ X}. (x∗)i and (x∗)i belong to ∆i by
definition. The union of the ∆i’s, that is to say ∆ = {xi :
x ∈ X, i ∈ A}, plays an important role in our proof - it
allows the construction of a common evaluation scale. ∆ is
naturally ordered by  and each ∆i is ordered by i. By
construction, we have:
Proposition 5. ∀x ∈ X, (x∗)i i x i (x∗)i.
Moreover, we can show that
Proposition 6. ∀xi, (x∗)i  xi  (x∗)i
(x∗)i is one of the best consequences for i and (x∗)i is
one of her worst ones. It may happen that one of the xi be
indifferent w.r.t.  to (x∗)i: i prefers xi to (x∗)i, but the
collectivity does not; this is due to the fact that agent i is not
so important, so the elements of X that are bad for her (e.g.
(x∗)i) are considered as not so bad for the collectivity.
Let us denote Bi = {xi ∈ ∆i : xi ∼ (x∗)i} the set of the
elements of ∆i that are indifferent to (x∗)i according to the
collectivity, and this even if agent i makes a difference; the
elements of Bi form an equivalence class according to  -
but, again, not necessarily according to i.
Let mi denotes the best of the elements of Bi (according to
i) 4. It reflects the importance of the agent: the greatestmi,
the lower the importance of i. Formally5:
Definition 3. For any i ∈ A, let mi = argmaxi{xi :
xi ∼ (x∗)i} be the discount degree of i.
Lemma 1. ∀x ∈ X, i = 1, p, xi ∼ maxi(mi, xi).
Lemma 2. ∀x ∈ X , x ∼ argmin {xi : i ∈ A}.
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we get:
Corollary 1. x ∼ argmin{maxi(mi, xi) : i ∈ A}.
In order to show that a relation satisfying Axioms 1-6 is
a pessimistic utility, (Dubois and Prade 1995) built the scale
U = {[x] : x ∈ X} where [x] is the equivalence class of x
according to . U is totally ordered by  and these authors
set u(x) = [x]. Here, we use the set ∆ = {xi : x ∈ X, i ∈
A}, partially ordered by the relation D defined by:
Definition 4. xi D yi iff xi i yi
4If |Bi| > 1, mi can be any one of its elements.
5In the following, there are many relations (preorders). For the
sake of clarity, we indicate for each minimum or maximum opera-
tion the preorder it relies on.
xiDyj iff xi i mi, yj j mj and xi  yj , for all i 6= j.
This relation is a partial preoder (it is reflexive and transi-
tive) but if xi ≺ mi and i 6= j, xi and yj are not comparable:
neither xiD yj nor yj Dxi hold, but this is harmeless. What
is important is that (i) the restriction of D to each ∆i is a
preorder (on ∆i, D =i) and (ii) that any xi that is as least
as good as mi (according to i) is comparable to any xj that
is as least as good as mj (according to j) . Properties (i) and
(ii) ensure that v(x) = minD{maxD(mi, xi) : i ∈ A} ex-
ists. Then from Corollary 1 and Definition 4 it follows that:
x ∼ v(x). Let k be the agent for which the min is reached
in the expression of v(x): v(x) = maxD(mk xk) belongs to
∆k and is such that v(x) k mk. Hence v(x) and v(y) are
comparable w.r.t. D, whatever x, y. This allows us to write:
Lemma 3. x  y iff argminD{maxD(mi, xi) : i ∈ A}
D argminD{maxD(mi, yi) : i ∈ A}.
Because working with a partial preorder is not so conve-
nient, we shall use any complete preorder D′ on ∆ such that
xD y =⇒ xD′ y (there always exists one). Then we get:
Lemma 4. x  y iff argminD′{maxD′(mi, xi) : i ∈ A}
D′ argminD′{maxD′(mi, yi) : i ∈ A}.
Since  satisfies Axioms 1-6, Dubois and Prade’s re-
sult applies: there exists an order reversing function n s.t.:
L  L′ iff min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]), u(x)) 
min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]), u(x)).
Let us denote u(x) = argminD′{maxD′(mi, xi) : i ∈
A} and next(v) = u(n(v)) (n(v) is an element of ∆). By
applying Lemma 4, we can write:
L  L′ iff minD′
x∈X
maxD′(next(L[x]), u(x)) D′
minD′
x∈X
maxD′(next(L′[x]), u(x)).
next(v), mi and xi, u(x) belong to ∆. In order to get a
total order, we consider the equivalence classes of ∆, i.e. the
set Uext = {[x] : x ∈ X} where [x] is the equivalence class
of x w.r.t.D′. Because x = argmin{xi : i ∈ A} (Lemma
2) Uext contains the equivalence classe of each x ∈ X to,
in particular, the equivalence classe [xi] of each xi; Uext is
ordered byD′ and is equipped with a maximal and a minimal
elements ([x∗] and [x∗], respectively).
Setting ui(x) = [xi], nwi = [mi] and n(v) = [next(v)],
we get:
L  L iff minD′
x∈X
maxD′(n(L[x]),minD′
i∈A
maxD′(ui(x), nwi))
D′
minD′
x∈X
maxD′(n(L[x]),minD′
i∈A
maxD′(ui(x), nwi)).
Hence the main result of this paper:
Theorem 1. If the collective preference and individual
preference relations satisfy Axioms 1-6, Pareto unanimity
(P) and the axiom of continuity of X (C) then there
exists a scale Uext totally ordered by D′, a distribu-
tion of weights nw : A 7→ Uext, a series of functions
ui : X 7→ Uext, i = 1, n and an order reversing function
n : V 7→ Uext s.t. for each couple of lotteries L and L′:
L  L′ iff min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]),min
i∈A
max(nwi, ui(x)))
D′
min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]),min
i∈A
max(nwi, ui(x))).
We can add two axioms that leads to pure egalitarianism.
Axiom E: ∀i, j, (x∗)i ∼ (x∗)j
Axiom PW: ∀i, if x i y then xi  yi
By E, the dissatisfaction of one agent has no more power
than the one of another agent. A direct consequence is that
the agents have the same discount degree. By PW, each
agent has some power (she makes the decision at least when
every other one is totally happy with both x and y). It implies
mi ∼i x∗, for each i. Because all i share the same discount
mi, Pareto unanimity implies that mi ∼ x∗.
This provides a characterization of the full egalitarian
CUF:
Theorem 2. If the collective preference and individual pref-
erence relations satisfy Axioms 1-6, P, C, E and PW then
there exists a scale Uext totally ordered by D′, a series of
functions ui : X 7→ Uext and an order reversing function
n : V 7→ Uext such that:
L  L′ iff min
x∈X
max(n(L[x]),min
i∈A
ui(x))
D′
min
x∈X
max(n(L′[x]),min
i∈A
ui(x)).
Conclusion
In conclusion, not only egalitarianism and decision under
uncertainty are compatible and can escape the Timing Ef-
fect, but egalitarianism is compulsory when the decision
is to be made on a possibilistic and cautious basis. This
is interpreted as a justification of egalitarianism, just like
Harsanyi’s theorem can be interpreted as a justification of
utilitarianism.
The present work, like the seminal work of Harsanyi, as-
sumes that all the agents share the same knowledge, which
is seldom the case. This consideration has been the topic of
several works, always in a probabilistic context (Harsanyi
1967; Hammond 1992): the ex-ante approach can be com-
patible with the existence of different quantifications of the
uncertainty (while the ex-post approach clearly requires a
unique knowledge); the Timing Effect shall not always be
understood as a paradox. The next step of our work is to
characterize egalitarianism in the context of a non homoge-
neous qualitative knowledge of the agents.
Another way of seeing Harsanyi’ Theorem - and ours -
is to say that the axioms simply transfer the additive na-
ture of probabilities on the collective utility function and
the cautiousness of pessimistic utility into a maximization
of the least satisfied agent. The problem has to be also stud-
ied without any explicit a priori assumption on the type of
knowledge - following Savage’s (1954) or Arrow’s (1950)
(see also (Hammond 1987)) ways rather than von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s. We probably then get that when egalitar-
ianism is required, the collective decision is made as if each
one were deciding in a qualitative, ordinal way. The proba-
bilities may exist in the mind of (some) decision makers, but
are not fully exploited. This is an exciting topic of further
research.
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